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This paper reviews the practice and performance of revenue forecasting in selected OECD 
countries. While the mean forecast errors are small in most countries, the precision of the 
forecasts measured by the standard deviation of the forecast error differs substantially across 
countries. Based on a comparison of forecasting practices we show that these differences can 
be attributed to a large part to differences in the timing of the forecasts and in the tax 
structure. In addition, we find some evidence that differences in methods and institutions also 
matter for the forecasting precision. In particular, we find that the use of macroeconomic 
models as well as the independence of revenue forecasting are associated with a lower 
standard deviation of the forecast error. 
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Revenue forecasting is an essential part of budgeting in the public sector and, hence, all countries
make some eorts to obtain reliable gures for the expected revenues. Of course, preparing rev-
enue forecasts is associated with some uncertainties, such as macroeconomic risks or uncertainties
about the tax law and its enforcement. Furthermore, there are changes in tax laws and structural
changes in the economy that make forecasting even more dicult. Another possible uncertainty
lies in repercussions of the revenue developments on public spending and the associated macro-
economic consequences. Although these challenges are faced by forecasters in all countries, there
are signicant dierences in the practice of revenue forecasting. Not only are there dierences in
methodologies used. The countries also show important dierences in the institutional aspects of
revenue forecasting. In several countries the government is directly in charge, other countries assign
the forecasting task to research institutes, and emphasize the independence of forecasting. This
raises the question of whether the forecasting performance is aected by the dierent practices
and methodologies involved. Moreover, given the eorts that some countries devote to ensuring
independence from possible government manipulation, it would be interesting to know whether this
independence has a noticeable impact on the quality of the forecasts.
The performance of revenue forecasting and its possible determinants including institutional aspects
have been explored in the literature in dierent directions (for a recent survey see Leal, Perez,
Tujula, and Vidal, 2008). Revenue forecasting has received most attention in the context of US
states' revenue forecasts. Feenberg, Gentry, Gilroy, and Rosen (1989), for instance, provide evidence
that state revenue forecasts are biased downwards. More recently, Boylan (2008) nds evidence
1for biases associated with the electoral cycle. Bretschneider, Gorr, Grizzle, and Klay (1989) focus
on the accuracy of revenue forecasts and nd that accuracy is higher in US states with competing
forecasts from executive and legislative branches. Moreover, Krause, Lewis, and Douglas (2006)
provide some evidence that the accuracy of states' revenue fund estimates depend systematically
on the stang of the revenue forecasting teams. As Bretschneider et al. note, however, the design
of US state governments has specic features such as balanced{budget rules and a rivalry between
executive and legislative branches of government which may explain some of these results.
International comparisons have mainly centered around the broader issue of budget and decit
forecasting. Recently, the relative performance of decit forecasts among the EU countries has
been examined in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. Jonung and Larch (2006), for
instance, have discussed the political biases in the output forecasts used for decit projections.
International comparisons concerned with the more narrow issue of revenue forecasting, however,
focus on developing countries (e.g., Kyobe and Danninger, 2005) where institutions relevant for
revenue forecasting are underdeveloped (Danninger, 2005).
Against this background this paper provides an analysis of the performance of revenue forecasting
and its determinants among twelve OECD countries. The selection of countries aims at captur-
ing the seven largest OECD economies (United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, UK, France, and
Canada). Some further countries were added where detailed information about revenue forecast-
ing was available. This includes selected countries in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Ireland,
Netherlands) and New Zealand.
What turns out is that the cross-country dierences in the performance of revenue forecasting are
2to some extent driven by country characteristics such as the tax structure both in terms of the
sheer number of taxes as well as with regard to the importance of corporation and income taxes.
Also dierences in the timing of the forecasts prove important. Controlling for these dierences we
also nd that the precision of revenue forecasting increases with the independence of forecasts from
possible government manipulation and if the revenue forecast is embedded in a macroeconomic
model.
The following section presents some descriptive statistics on the performance of revenue forecasting
in the sample of OECD countries. Section 3 provides a brief overview on the dierent conditions
that forecasters face in these countries. Section 4 gives a short account of the forecasting method-
ologies used in the various countries. Section 5 provides an overview of the institutional aspects
of the forecasting task among the selected OECD countries and sets up a simple indicator of the
independence of revenue forecasting. Section 6 presents empirical evidence on the determinants of
forecasting performance. Section 7 provides our conclusions.
2 Forecasting Performance
A common way to assess the quality of revenue forecasts is to consider the prediction error, that is
the dierence between predicted and realized revenues. A smaller prediction error is then usually
regarded as a better forecast quality. However, it should be noted that revenue forecasts are basi-
cally used to indicate the revenue constraint that needs to be taken into account in the preparation
of the public budget. Often, the budget will include expenditures that have a direct or indirect ef-
fect on tax revenues. While foreseeing these implications might result in a smaller forecast error, it
3is not clear whether this constitutes an improvement of a forecast that basically aims at providing
the policy maker with information about the revenue constraint. In the discussion of the revi-
sions of US revenue forecasts, therefore, policy changes are distinguished from (macro-)economic
and so-called technical sources (Auerbach, 1999) of forecast errors, where the latter may refer to
tax administration or evasion, for instance. However, for most countries a decomposition is not
available. Therefore, the quantitative analysis presented below is based on the overall forecast
error.
The one-year-ahead forecast errors for total revenues observed over the last ten years1 are graph-
ically depicted in Figure 1, where each point represents a single forecast error. Note that the
forecasts are arranged in this gure in descending order of the respective standard deviation of
the forecast error. At rst sight the gure seems to suggest that in most cases there is some
underestimation going on. But there are also instances of large overestimations.
Table 1 provides the corresponding gures for the mean forecast error and its standard deviation.
A positive sign indicates an overestimation of revenues, a negative sign an underestimation. In all
cases, except for Germany, Japan, and the CBO forecast in the United States, there is a slight
underestimation of revenues. The largest mean is found for the Canadian forecast which shows an
underestimation of 4.4% on average. However, given the large standard deviations this is the only
case where the mean shows a statistically signicant dierence from zero at reasonable levels of
signicance.
As a measure of the precision of forecasts we rely on the standard deviation of the forecast error.
1 In the case of Italy there are just nine years, in the case of France eight years, and for the Netherlands due to
structural breaks just ve out of the last seven years considered.
4Figure 1: Forecast Errors
CBO: US Congressional Budet Oce, OMB: US Oce of Management and Budget, J: Japan, NL: Nether-
lands, IRL: Ireland, D5: Germany May Forecast, I: Italy, CDN: Canada, NZ: New Zealand, D11: Germany
November Forecast, F: France, B: Belgium, A: Austria, UK: United Kingdom.
Figure displays the one-year-ahead forecast errors for total tax revenues in percentage for up to ten years in
each country, each point representing one forecast. A positive (negative) value denotes overestimation (un-
derestimation). The forecasts are arranged in descending order of the standard deviation of the respective
forecast errors. The two US forecasts only refer to federal taxes.
5Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Forecast Errors
Country Mean Std.dev. Obs.
(1) (2) (3)
Austria -0.037 2.279 10
Belgium -1.193 2.478 10
Canada -4.363 4.163 10
France -1.025 2.808 8
Germany: May 2.496 4.859 10
Germany: Nov 0.498 3.485 10
Ireland -2.133 5.759 10
Italy -2.249 4.538 9
Japan 0.516 8.911 10
Netherlands -3.403 6.203 5
New Zealand -1.291 4.063 10
United Kingdom -0.286 2.069 10
USA: CBO 0.609 10.879 10
USA: OMB -0.522 9.613 10
Average -0.777 5.812 132
The rst column shows the mean of the one-year-ahead forecast error for total revenues in percentage.
A positive (negative) value denotes overestimation (underestimation). The second column depicts the
standard deviation of the forecast error in percentage. The last column reports the number of observations.
6The most precise forecast would then show the smallest standard deviation of the forecast error.
Taking into account that in most cases no signicant bias is found, this forecast would also be the
most ecient one. As can be seen in Column (2) of Table 1 the highest precision is achieved in the
United Kingdom and Austria, while we nd the lowest precision in the United States and Japan.
3 Conditions Faced by Forecasters
An assessment of the considerable dierences in the precision of forecasts needs to take account of
the dierent conditions faced by the forecaster. First of all this is an issue of the point of time when
the forecast is made. This can be illustrated by the two German forecasts that take place in May
and November while the budget period starts in January. The standard deviation decreases in the
latter by about a quarter presumably due to the decreasing degree of uncertainty, which is naturally
lower in November than in March. But also across countries there are important dierences in the
time span between the forecast and the beginning of the forecasted period (see Column (1) of Table
2). Actually, this time span varies between less than one and 9.5 months.
A second important dierence lies in the tax structure of the countries. In particular, the degree
of dierentiation of the tax system might matter. Rather than relying on few large taxes a country
might employ a variety of smaller tax instruments and, thereby, reduce the revenue risks associated
with the tax system. Therefore, forecasting the revenues of a large variety of small taxes might be
easier than predicting the revenues in a system that relies on a small number of large taxes. To
capture the dierentiation of the tax structure we use an indicator of the number of taxes. For
the calculation we rely on the OECD Revenue Statistics. More specically, we employ the most
7Table 2: Forecasting Conditions
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The time span in the rst column measures the period between the forecast and the beginning of the
forecasted period in months. In the second column the number of taxes existing in the respective country
is shown based on the OECD Revenue Statistics.
8detailed classication of taxes and count all items with positive revenues. This is, of course, just
an approximation, as the OECD classication meets the various tax systems to a dierent extent.
However, as documented in Column (2) there are large dierences across countries/forecasts.
Some taxes might be more dicult to predict than others. For instance, we might expect that there
are signicant dierences in the precision when forecasting corporation or income taxes as compared
to sales and value added taxes. This calls for a separate analysis of forecast errors according to the
type of tax considered (see below).
4 Forecasting Methodology
The forecasting methodology used by the fourteen regular revenue forecasts that are surveyed in
this paper shows several similarities. In all countries, the forecasts are prepared in a disaggregated
fashion for a number of single taxes, whereby often individual taxes are aggregated into groups
especially if they share the same source or tax payer. This partly reects the need to employ
up-to-date information on current revenues, which is available usually only on a cash basis.
A typical feature of revenue forecasting is that taxes which are strongly driven by macroeconomic
developments such as corporation taxes or wage and income taxes are forecasted with indirect
methods. In these cases revenue estimation relies on information about macroeconomic variables
such as GDP, or components of the national accounts, like income from entrepreneurial activity
and capital or the wage bill. Predominantly, the elasticity method is employed where some previ-
ously estimated elasticity is used to predict revenue growth based on the predicted development of
9the macroeconomic indicators. Some forecasts (United Kingdom, Netherlands, New Zealand, and
Japan) reportedly make use of econometric models where the relationship between revenues and
economic indicators is directly estimated using regression analysis.
In some cases the use of micro-simulation methods is reported which are focusing on individual
tax payers such as households or corporations and where the accrued taxes for each individual are
calculated and aggregated afterwards. This approach is used in the Netherlands and the United
States in forecasting income taxes, in the United Kingdom and the United States for predicting
corporation tax revenues.
While the macroeconomic forecasts are used as exogenous variables in countries such as Germany
and Belgium, repercussions of revenue forecasts on the macroeconomic forecast over the budget are
taken into account in some other countries. In particular, revenue forecasts that are embedded in
a macroeconomic model (United Kingdom and Netherlands) produce a consistent set of macroe-
conomic and revenue forecasts. Other countries such as Ireland, New Zealand, and the United
States (CBO) report the mutual verication and acknowledgement of macroeconomic and revenue
forecasts.
For less important taxes { in terms of revenues { like excise taxes, but also for taxes with just a
weak relation to macroeconomic variables usually direct methods are employed. These methods,
like trend-extrapolation or more formal time-series analysis, use revenue data of the respective tax
from previous years to predict the expected development. Also the usage of vector-autoregressive
methods for groups of taxes is reported.
A subtle issue for revenue forecasting is how to deal with changes in the tax law, in particular,
10if changes are planned but have not yet been enacted as a law. In some countries, it is common
practice to include changes that are agreed within the government (Austria, Netherlands) or noted
in the budget plan (Ireland). Even if tax law changes that are just planned are not directly taken
into account in the forecast, their expected macroeconomic impact sometimes leads to an indirect
inuence on the forecast.
5 Institutions and Independence
A basic institutional aspect of revenue forecasting is the assignment of the forecasting task to specic
institutions. Interestingly, forecasting is not always assigned to a department of the government
or, more precisely, to the executive branch of the government. Only in about half of the fourteen
forecasts surveyed in this paper it is the Ministry of Finance (Belgium, France, Italy, Ireland, Japan)
or the Treasury (United Kingdom, New Zealand) that is responsible. In most other cases forecasting
is assigned to a group representing dierent institutions, not only from the government. Some
countries even assign the primary responsibility for revenue forecasting to independent research
institutes (Netherlands) and limit the inuence of government to merely consult forecasters. In the
other countries, even if the Ministry of Finance or another part of the government is responsible,
often external experts from academia or forecasting agencies are included in the forecasting group.
The eorts to involve institutions that are not part of the government or other external experts
are usually justied as a means to raise the independence of the revenue forecasting from possi-
ble manipulation and strategic inuences by the government. Several countries explicitly produce
consensus forecasts, where all institutions and experts involved have to agree on the forecast (e.g.,
11Germany and Austria). However, the extent to which forecasting is independent from govern-
ment manipulation is not only depending on the assignment of the forecasting responsibility but
also on whether revenue forecasting is based on some ocial predictions for the macroeconomic
development, as is the case with the German forecast.
Table 3 presents information about how revenue forecasting diers with respect to these issues.
The rst column indicates whether the government (=0), research institutes (=1) or both jointly
(=0.5) are responsible for the forecast. In some cases there are no research institutes involved,
but in order to preserve a certain degree of independence there are external experts consulted (see
Column (2)). This is the case for the US forecasts of the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) and
the Oce of Management and Budget (OMB). In the case of the United Kingdom a value of 0.5 is
entered, in order to take account of the reported partial consultation of experts. Also for Germany
a gure 0.5 is entered in order to account for the additional participation of the German central
bank. For the Netherlands a gure of -1 is entered to take account of the consulting participation
of the ministry of nance that may tend to reduce independence. Even if the revenue forecast is
done with collaboration of the government, in some countries an external, non-government macroe-
conomic forecast is used. Therefore, the third column provides information about the source of the
macroeconomic forecast. A value of one indicates that an external forecast is used.
By summing across the rst three columns we obtain a simple indicator of the independence of
revenue forecasting. The rst column is weighted with unity, the second and the third columns are
weighted with 0.25. The rational behind this weighting is the following: a revenue forecast that
is conducted by a research institute without any government experts involved would display the
maximum level of independence (=1). A government forecast that includes external experts and
12employs an external macroeconomic forecast would obtain a medium level of independence (=0.5).
A government forecast without any external experts and without an external macroeconomic fore-
cast would be assigned the lowest level of independence (=0).
While the indicator varies from zero (=no independence) to unity (=full independence), in our
sample of countries the highest degree of independence is 0.75. As can be seen, the indicator
is highest for the Netherlands and Austria, followed by Germany. A small, but positive level of
independence can be found in Canada, New Zealand, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The United
States case is somewhat special since here two separate forecasts exist. One is conducted by the
Oce of Management and Budget (OMB) that assists the executive branch, the other is conducted
by the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) that is assigned to the legislative branch. While their
incentives to strategically manipulate forecasts might dier, our indicator of independence, which is
simply assessing the institutional conditions, assigns a low value of independence to both of them.2
The general composition of the index with its emphasis on research institutes, external experts, and
the source of the macroeconomic forecast reects the main institutional characteristics of revenue
forecasting. Yet the weights, used to aggregate the information about these institutional aspects,
are somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, we conducted some robustness checks where the weights for
external experts and external macroeconomic forecasts were increased or lowered. With regard to
the ranking, however, only minor changes were found. We will come back to this issue below, where
we explore whether the index of independence has sucient informational content in order to help
explaining the observed performance.
2Bretschneider et al. (1989) argue that the existence of two separate forecasts by the legislative and the executive
branch exerts a positive eect on forecasting accuracy, in particular, when both forecasts are forced into a consensus.
This is, however, not the case with the OMB and CBO.
13Table 3: Institutional Characteristics and Independence
Research Ext./Gov. Macroecon. Indepen-
Country institutes experts forecast dence
Netherlands 1 -1 0 0.75
Austria .5 0 1 0.75
Germany: May .5 .5 0 0.625
Germany: Nov .5 .5 0 0.625
USA: OMB 0 1 0 0.25
USA: CBO 0 1 0 0.25
Canada 0 0 1 0.25
New Zealand 0 1 0 0.25
Belgium 0 0 1 0.25
United Kingdom 0 .5 0 0.125
Japan 0 0 0 0.00
France 0 0 0 0.00
Italy 0 0 0 0.00
Ireland 0 0 0 0.00
First column indicates whether the government (=0), research institutes (=1) or both jointly are responsible
for the forecast (=0.5). Second column indicates whether external (=1) or government experts (=-1) are
involved. For the United Kingdom a value of 0.5 is entered, in order to take account of the reported
partial consultation of experts. In Germany a gure 0.5 is entered in order to account for the participation
of the central bank. Third column provides information about whether an external, non-government
macroeconomic forecast is used. The degree of independence in the last column is obtained as a weighted
sum of the rst three columns. The rst column is weighted with unity, the second and the third columns
are weighted with 0.25 (see text).
146 Determinants of Forecasting Performance
Having outlined dierences in forecasting conditions and practices let us nally turn to the question
as to what extent they are associated with the large dierences in forecasting performance noted
above. Since in most cases the mean forecast error does not point at signicant biases, we focus
on the precision of forecasting as documented by the standard deviation of forecast errors. More
specically, we analyze the precision of the forecasts for total revenues as well as for revenues
grouped using a broad classication of the sources of taxation.
The rst two regressions in Table 4 explore whether dierences in forecasting conditions show
some signicant relation with the standard deviation of the forecast error for total tax revenues.
Column (1) just includes the time span between the forecast and forecasted period and indicates
that the uncertainty increases considerably with the time span: every additional month increases
the standard deviation by a half percentage point. In Column (2) we have included the number
of individual taxes as a measure of the dierentiation of the tax system. Accordingly, forecasting
is more accurate in countries where the number of taxes is large. The coecient of determination
indicates that about two thirds of the variation in the forecasting accuracy are associated with
dierences in the time span and the number of taxes involved.
Columns (3) and (4) show the same specications augmented with our indicator of independence
of revenue forecasting. While the results from Columns (1) and (2) are conrmed, we nd that the
precision of the forecast is positively associated with independence. As the indicator of indepen-
dence rests on a weighted sum of three institutional characteristics we conducted some robustness










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16external experts or external macroeconomic forecasts are increased or lowered by 0.1, for instance,
all eects are conrmed while the coecient of determination is slightly lower with these alterna-
tive weights. The specication in Column (4) indicates that about three fourth of the variation in
the precision can be attributed to the time span, the number of taxes involved, and the degree of
independence.
The results presented in Columns (5) to (7) indicate that embedding revenue forecasts into a
macroeconomic model is associated with a higher precision. However, this eect is not signicant.
In further experiments (not shown) we tested for an association with the country size but did not
nd any signicance.
Table 5 provides results for the precision of forecasts decomposed into four dierent types of taxes:
(personal) income taxes, corporation taxes, sales taxes and other taxes. Thus, for each group of
taxes we compute a separate standard deviation of the forecast error.3 A rst specication uses
a similar set of variables as Column (4) of Table 4. In addition, it includes dummy variables for
each group of taxes. The coecients of these variables point at strong dierences in forecasting
accuracy: income taxes and, in particular, corporation taxes show a much larger standard deviation
of the forecast error. While the dummy variables point at an important role of the tax structure,
the number of taxes in each group does not show a signicant eect (see Column 1). However,
further inspection revealed that the number of taxes is particularly high among sales and other
taxes. Hence, the negative signicant eect of the number of taxes obtained in the above analysis
of the total forecast error is now picked up by the dummy variables for the groups of taxes. We,
therefore, exclude the number of taxes in the subsequent analysis and focus on the dummy vari-
3Missing values are encountered since detailed information was not available for all countries.
17Table 5: Determinants of Forecasting Precision by Type of Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time span .868 ? .860 ? .636 ? -.037 -.050
(.241) (.240) (.243) (.253) (.235)
Time span  Tax type 1 .550 .405
(.332) (.324)
Time span  Tax type 2 2.06 ? 2.06 ?
(.354) (.278)
Time span  Tax type 3 .286 .286
(.314) (.287)
Micro-simulation 6.17 ? 6.63 ? 7.71 ?
(2.99) (1.39) (1.06)
Independence -4.76 ? -4.60 ? -3.25 ? -3.25 ? -2.86 ?
(1.89) (1.79) (1.63) (1.31) (1.32)
Macro model -2.26 ? -2.35 ? -.612
(1.34) (1.10) (2.56)
Macro model  Tax type 1 -2.61
(3.40)
Macro model  Tax type 2 -5.80 ?
(2.74)
Macro model  Tax type 3 .271
(2.87)
log No. of taxes by category .351
(.945)
Tax type 1 (Income taxes) 7.54 ? 7.94 ? 6.48 ? 6.43 ? 6.12 ?
(1.48) (1.19) (1.21) (.974) (1.03)
Tax type 2 (Corporation taxes) 15.44 ? 15.77 ? 14.56 ? 14.88 ? 15.17 ?
(1.88) (1.95) (1.85) (1.09) (1.09)
Tax type 3 (Sales taxes) 4.93 5.97 ? 5.83 ? 5.80 ? 5.41 ?
(3.03) (.989) (.927) (.754) (.772)
Tax type 4 (Others) 5.19 ? 5.88 ? 5.74 ? 5.68 ? 5.33 ?
(2.58) (1.36) (1.27) (.857) (.893)
R2 0.849 0.849 0.879 0.944 0.952
Observations 50 50 50 50 50
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of forecast error for tax revenues grouped into four types of taxes.
Weighted least squares estimates taking account of the number of forecasts considered in the computation
of the standard deviation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates signicance at the
10% level.
18ables for the types of taxes. As documented by the coecient of determination in Column (2),
nevertheless, about 85% of the dierences in the precision can be assigned to tax structure, timing,
and independence.
Column (3) includes controls for micro-simulation models used in the respective group and for
embedding the revenue forecast into a macroeconomic model. While the integration of revenue
forecasting into a macroeconomic model is found to improve the quality of the forecast, micro-
simulations seem to be associated with a reduced precision. However, the latter nding might well
reect a selection eect, since micro-simulation methods might be implemented for those taxes
where the forecaster faces a substantial complexity.
In the fourth specication we control for possible dierences in the eect of the timing among the
dierent groups of taxes. As can be seen, the time span is relevant, particularly for corporation
taxes, but also for income taxes. Probably, the precision of the GDP forecast is very important for
these taxes; and this precision is very likely to decrease with the time span. In Column (5) also
the eect of embedding the forecast into a macroeconomic model is allowed to dier between the
various groups of taxes. Since the standard deviation of the forecast error is signicantly lower,
macroeconomic models are found to be particularly helpful in predicting corporation taxes. This
points at the importance of macroeconomic repercussions for those taxes.
197 Conclusions
In this paper we have compared revenue forecasting practice and performance across selected OECD
countries. While the mean one-year-ahead forecast error is small in most countries, the precision of
the forecasts measured by the standard deviation of the forecast error diers substantially across
countries. This raises the question of whether dierences in the performance are associated with
the practice of revenue forecasting in these countries.
A consideration of methodological aspects shows fairly similar approaches among all countries.
Taxes being sensitive to the business cycle (such as income and corporation taxes) are mainly
forecasted with indirect methods that are based on macroeconomic indicators. For other taxes,
direct methods are employed, where the forecast is a function of the revenues from previous years.
Methodological dierences are found with regard to macroeconomic models and micro-simulation
models. In some countries revenue forecasts are directly embedded in a macroeconomic model,
where budgetary repercussions are directly taken into account. Micro-simulations are used in some
countries to predict revenues for specic taxes such as income taxes.
Institutional arrangements vary between countries. While in some countries the ministry of nance
or the treasury is responsible, other countries assign the forecasting task to research institutes.
Further dierences arise with regard to the inclusion of external experts and with regard to the
source of macroeconomic forecasts. To summarize these dierences we come up with an index of
the independence from possible government manipulation. According to this index the revenue
forecasts are most independent in the Netherlands and in Austria.
20The quantitative analysis shows that the cross-country dierences in the performance of revenue
forecasting are to some extent driven by country characteristics such as the tax structure with regard
to the number of taxes and the importance of income and corporation taxes. Also dierences in
the timing of the forecasts prove important. Controlling for these dierences we also nd that the
precision of revenue forecasting increases with the independence of forecasts. About three quarters
of the dierences in accuracy concerning the total revenues can be explained by dierences in the
tax structure, the time span, and the degree of independence.
These results are conrmed when distinguishing between four groups of taxes, i.e. income taxes,
corporation taxes, sales taxes, and a residual category. This analysis further shows that the fore-
casting accuracy is particularly low for corporation taxes. For these taxes we nd that the precision
depends strongly on the time-span between the forecast and the beginning of the forecasted period.
With regard to methods, we see that the precision turns out to be rather low where micro-simulation
methods are applied. Embedding the forecast in a macroeconomic model, however, is associated
with a lower standard deviation of the forecast error in particular for the corporation taxes.
Appendix: Sources of Information
A.1 Austria
The revenue forecast for Austria is documented/discussed in:
 Bundesministerium f ur Finanzen (2007): Budget 2007-2008, Zahlen { Hintergr unde { Zusam-
menh ange. Online: www.bmf.gv.at
 Homepage of the Ministry of Finance: www.bmf.gv.at
 Homepage of the Wifo ( Osterreichisches Institut f ur Wirtschaftsforschung): www.wifo.ac.at
21 Leibrecht (2004)
A.2 Belgium
The revenue forecast of the federal government is documented/discussed in:
 Chambre des repr esentants de Belgique: Budgets des Recettes et des D epenses pour l'ann ee
budg etaire 1996, ... pour l'ann ee budg etaire 2007, Brussels
 Hertveldt, Bart et al. (2003)
 Lenoir, Thierry und Valenduc, Christian (2006): R evision de la m ethode macro- economique
d'estimation des recettes scales. Service Public F ed eral Finances, Brussels
A.3 Canada
The spring revenue forecast of the Canadian Department of Finance is documented/discussed in:
 M uhleisen et al. (2005)
 O'Neill, Tim (2005): Review of Canadian Federal Fiscal Forecasting: Processes and Systems.
O'Neill Strategic Economics. Online: www.n.gc.ca/toce/2005/oneil e.html
 Homepage of the Department of Finance Canada: www.n.gc.ca
A.4 France
The revenue forecast of the French government is documented/discussed in:
 Homepage of the Juridictions nanci eres: www.ccomptes.fr
 Homepage of the Minist ere des Finances: www.mine.gouv.fr
 Homepage of the Minist ere du Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la fonction publique:
www.budget.gouv.fr
 Les d eterminants des ressources de l' Etat: www.vie-publique.fr
22A.5 Germany
The centralized forecast of the consensus forecasting group is documented/discussed in:
 Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Finanzbericht 1997-2008
 Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2005): 50 Jahre Arbeitskreis \ Steuersch atzung"
 Gebhardt (2001)
 Homepage of the Ministry of Finance: www.bundesnanzministerium.de
A.6 Ireland
The revenue forecast of the Irish Government is documented/discussed in:
 Budgets of the Department of Finance: www.budget.gov.ie
 Homepage of the Ministry of Finance: www.nance.gov.ie
 Homepage of the Revenue Commissioners: www.revenue.ie
 Minutes of the \Committee of Public Accounts" of the Irish Parliament on 23. January 2003:
www.irlgov.ie/committees-29/c-publicaccounts/20030123/Page1.htm
 Report of the Tax Forecasting Methodology Review Group, 2008: www.nance.gov.ie
 The Tax Forecasting Methodology Group, 1999: www.nance.gov.ie
A.7 Italy
The revenue forecast of the Italian government is documented/discussed in:
 Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Rome: Documento di Programmazione Economico
e Finanziaria per gli anni 1998-2000, ... per gli anni 2006-2009
 Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2007), Rome: Conti e aggregati economici delle Amminis-
trazioni pubbliche. Statistiche in breve, anni 1980-2006
23A.8 Japan
The revenue forecast of the Japanese government is documented/discussed in:
 Adachi (2006), (in Japanese), PRI Discussion Paper Series, No. 06A-07
 Homepage of the Cabinett Oce: www.cao.go.jp
 Homepage of the Ministry of Finance: www.mof.go.jp
A.9 Netherlands
The revenue forecast of the CPB is documented/discussed in:
 Bos (2007).
 CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2005): Forecasting Tax Revenue.
CPB Presentation
 European Commission (2006): European Economy No 3 / 2006, Public nances in EMU {
2006
 Homepage of the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis: www.cpb.nl
 Ministry of Finance (2007): Stability Programme of the Netherlands, November 2007 Update:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/about/activities/sgp/
country/countryles/dec 2007/nl 2007 en.pdf
 Teulings, Coen (2006): Forecasting, Policy Evaluation and the Budgetary Process. Lessons
from the Netherlands. CPB Presentation
A.10 New Zealand
The revenue forecast of the Treasury is documented/discussed in:
 Homepage of the Treasury: www.treasury.govt.nz
 Keene and Thomson (2007)
 New Zealand Treasury (2002): Treasury's Forecasting Process. Presentation Online: www.treasury.govt.nz
 New Zealand Treasury (2007): Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2007. Online: www.treasury.govt.nz
24A.11 United Kingdom
The revenue forecast of the Treasury is documented/discussed in:
 HM Treasury (2007a): Budget 2007, HM Treasury, London
 HM Treasury (2007b): Meeting the aspirations of the British people: 2007 Pre-Budget Report
and Comprehensive Spending Review, HM Treasury, London
 Homepage of the Treasury: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk
 Pike, Tim und Savage, David (1998): Forecasting the Public Finances in the Treasury. Fiscal
Studies 19(1), 49{62
A.12 USA
The forecasts for federal revenues by the Congressional Budget Oce and the Oce of Management
and Budget are documented/discussed in:
 Auerbach (1999).
 Congressional Budget Oce (1995): Budget Estimates: Current Practices and Alternative
Approaches. CBO Papers Series, Washington D.C.
 Congressional Budget Oce (1998): Projecting Federal Tax Revenues and the Eect of
Changes in Tax Law Memorandum, Washington D.C.
 Congressional Budget Oce (2006): CBO's Policies for Preparing and Distributing Its Esti-
mates and Analyses, Washington D.C.
 Congressional Budget Oce (2007): The Uncertainty of Budget Projections: A Discussion of
Data and Methods. Memorandum, Washington D.C.
 Homepage of the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO): www.cbo.gov
 Homepage of the Oce of Management and Budget (OMB): www.whitehouse.gov/omb
 Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) (1992): Discussion of Revenue Estimation Methodology
and Process. US Government Printing Oce, Washington D.C.
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